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conflicts. Hopefully, the republication of this symposium will stimulate greater interest in
their observance in the future.
Stephen T. Hosmer
April, 2006
FOREWORD TO THE NEW EDITION v
vii
PREFACE
T on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency that was held at e
Corporation’s Washington Office during the week of April 16, 1962. e Symposium was
sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and was organized and chaired by
Stephen T. Hosmer of ’ Social Science Department.
e basic rationale in undertaking the Symposium was that, rather than approach
the problems of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare theoretically and academically, it
might be useful to draw on the knowledge of men of recent and direct experience in
counterinsurgency, with a view to assembling a large body of detailed information and
judgment on the multifarious aspects of this inadequately explored form of conflict. It
was hoped that such a pragmatic approach would not only provide fruitful insights into
earlier struggles but would, above all, yield valuable lessons for the future. e main
criterion in the selection of the participants, therefore, was that each have firsthand and
successful experience in some phase of insurgent or counterinsurgent operations.
was most fortunate in being able to bring together the particular group of mili-
tary and civilian experts who constituted the Symposium.* e biographic information
about the participants’ background and achievements reflects not only their unusually
high caliber but also the diversity of their experience, knowledge, and special skills. Some
of these men had been combat leaders; some occupied headquarters positions; still others
were engaged in highly specialized activities such as civic action or operations research
into weapons and communications technology. Together, they combined the experience
of some nine different theaters of insurgency during the last twenty years, including such
key areas as Malaya, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Kenya, and Algeria.
*Since not all the participants were able to attend every meeting, the schedule was so planned as to permit those
whose time was limited to be present at the discussions that bore on their own experience and special interests.
viii COUNTERINSURGENCY: A SYMPOSIUM
To derive maximum benefit from this wealth and variety of expertise, the Sympo-
sium was conducted in a manner that would encourage the freest possible exchange of
ideas and experiences. Hence there were no formal papers, but only informal roundtable
discussions in which the members of the group were asked to present their opinions and
to draw freely on their recollections of problems encountered and techniques employed
in their areas of operations.
To give the Symposium a degree of structure and continuity, “Proposed Terms of
Reference” (see Appendix) were drafted and distributed to the participants in advance
of the meetings to serve, not as a rigid agenda, but as a general outline and guide to the
discussions. As was inevitable in view of the scope and complexity of the subject, not all
aspects of counterinsurgency could be covered exhaustively. Some that might have been
treated in greater detail, had time permitted it, were only touched on in passing, and
some aspects were not discussed at all. en again, several points were more prominently
debated than had been envisaged.
e summary of the discussions, which constitutes the present report, follows the
order and progression of the meetings as closely as possible in the hope of conveying
something of the spontaneous character of the talks and the manner in which certain
findings and generalizations evolved. It is hoped that the detailed subheadings at the
beginning of each section will prove useful in orienting the reader whose interest may be
confined to particular questions. (e ten sections of the report correspond to the ten
half-day sessions of the Symposium, and a listing of the participants present appears at
the beginning of each section.)
e report was prepared by our rapporteur, Sibylle Crane, who attended all sessions
and was able also to consult the taped recordings of the proceedings. Each participant in
the Symposium had an opportunity to read and amend in draft form all statements in the
report that were attributed to him.
It is well to realize that, with a few exceptions, the officers and civilians who took
part in the Symposium were intimately associated only with particular phases of the
larger campaigns in which they served, and their experience was often confined to one
geographic sector of the total theater. eir generalizations, as the participants themselves
were careful to point out, necessarily reflect each individual’s personal vantage point in
time and place and may not in every case be equally valid for all periods and regions of
the conflict to which they refer.
As the following report shows, the Symposium succeeded in yielding a variety of
informed viewpoints and significant individual experiences, which in turn led to many
valuable cross references, comparisons, and at times disagreements. However, the talks
also revealed surprisingly large areas of agreement and community of experience.
Although no conscious attempt was made to establish a consensus on a given idea or tech-
nique, or to formulate universally valid principles, the participants recorded a high degree
of concurrence—often unanimity—on major premises and principles of operations, as
well as some unexpected similarities of experience. To the extent compatible with the for-
mat of this report, such areas of understanding, agreed principles, and parallel experience
have been stressed editorially.
e Corporation owes a debt of profound gratitude to the participants who,
in spite of pressing commitments elsewhere, found the time to contribute so generously
to this Symposium. It is hoped that those who must deal with current and future prob-
lems of counterinsurgency will find some profit in the summary of an exchange of views
by highly articulate practitioners of an art of warfare that is assuming an ever-growing
importance in our military thinking and planning.
PREFACE ix
xi
MEMBERS OF THE SYMPOSIUM
Chairman: S T. H
e RAND Corporation
Formal Participants*
C T.R. B, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS-Ret.
W W. F, Colonel, USA-Ret.
D G, Lieutenant Colonel (French Marine Corps)
A S. J, Captain (British Army)
F E. K, MBE, MC, Lieutenant Colonel (British Army)
E G L, Brigadier General, USAF
R C. P, III
D L P-J, DSO, OBEY Brigadier General
(British Army)
J R. S, OBE, Colonel (British Army-Ret.)
N D. V, Colonel (formerly with the Armed Forces
of the Philippines)
J F. W, Colonel (Royal Australian Army)
S V. W, Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Advanced Research Projects Agency
T W. B, Colonel, USMC
E V. R
e Corporation
J.W. E, J.
T E. G
G K. T
*For biographies, see pp. xix-xxiii.
xiii
CONTENTS
F N E iii
P vii
M S xi
B F P xix
C P G W 1
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency as They Differ from Ordinary Warfare:
Their Main Objective, Control of the Population ~ The Political and Psycho-
logical Side of Guerrilla Warfare, and the Importance of the Ideological Base ~
The Crucial Function of the Trained Political Cadre ~ The “Secure Base” of the
Guerrilla as a Political Rather Than a Physical Asset ~ A Review and Analysis of
Areas of Potential Insurgency Today
P O C S E O-
O A 12
The Indispensable Need for Popular Support ~ How Important a Target Is the
Individual Enemy Leader? ~ French Operations in Algeria: Principles and Typi-
cal Procedures; How To “Clean” a Contaminated Village, Procure Intelligence,
and Establish Lasting Control; “Compartmentalizing” a Newly Recaptured Area
in the Postmilitary Phase ~ Choosing Priority Targets for Concentrated Effort:
Various Nonmilitary Criteria; the Merits of Widely Distributed Small-scale Op-
erations ~ Mobilizing Local Society To Aid the Counterinsurgent Effort ~ The
Judicious Use of Terror and the Importance of Lawful Procedures ~ Civilian or
Military Control of the Overall Effort? Several Views ~ Preferred Organizational
Structures for Effective Counterinsurgency (the Examples of Algeria, the Phil-
ippines, and Malaya) ~ Disrupting the Guerrilla’s Program for Conquest ~ The
Power To Protect the Local Populace as a Prerequisite for Winning Its Support
xiv COUNTERINSURGENCY: A SYMPOSIUM
T T C W (I) 29
Principles of the Defense of Fixed (Military and Nonmilitary) Installations in
Guerrilla Warfare ~ Patrolling ~ Ambush and Counterambush, and Their Mod-
ern Refinements ~ Optimum Size of Patrol and Ambush Party ~ Firearms for
Ambush and Patrol: Comparative Merits of Different Weapons; the Noisy as
against the Silent Weapon; Some Preferences and Recommendations ~ Clearing
Potential Ambush Sites: Two Views ~ The Importance of Ambush Drill ~ The
Uses of Dogs ~ The Main Objective of Pursuing the Guerrilla
T T C W (II)
41
Border Control: Terrain, Manpower, and Cost as Limiting Factors; a Detailed
Description of How Borders Were Sealed in Algeria ~ Containing the Enemy
within a Known Area ~ Massive “Saturation” Tactics ~ Encirclement and Sweep-
ing Operations: Planned or Improvised; Infiltrating the Guerrillas by Exploiting
Their Lack of Intercommunication ~ Pseudogang Operations and Other Uses
of Disguise ~ Emergency Alert Systems: The Effective Use of Radio in Algeria ~
Drying up the Enemy’s Supply of Arms and Equipment: Various Methods ~ Food
Denial ~ Surface Logistics: A Typical Backpack for Deep-jungle Penetration; the
Suitability of Present-day Vehicular Equipment for Guerrilla Terrain; Amphibi-
ous Carriers; the Inadequacy of River Vehicles; the Case for Planes and Helicop-
ters in Support of Ground Troops; Aircraft for Reconnaissance ~ Air Logistics:
The Pro and Con of Air Supply; Free-drop versus Parachute; Compensating for
Loss of Surprise; the Morale Effects of an Airlift Capability on the Troops of
Both Sides
P T P A 56
Gearing the Aim of the Counterinsurgent to the Objective of the Insurgent ~
Co-ordinating Political and Psychological Ends ~ A Step-by-step Prescription for
Wresting Political Control from the Insurgent: Screening the Population; Identi-
fying Potential Supporters; Selecting Cadres; Organizing an Indigenous Political
Leadership; Supporting Each Step by “Strategic” and “Tactical” Propaganda ~
Three Requisites for Success: A Firm Ideological Base, Resolute Counterinsur-
gent Leadership, and Expert Knowledge of Revolutionary Warfare ~ Subordinat-
ing Military to Civilian Authority Wherever Possible: How This Policy Succeeded
in Malaya and the Philippines, and Why ~ Children as a Source of Intelligence:
Ethical Barriers to Their Exploitation; the Incidental Rewards of Kindness ~
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